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IMPORTING PRISON LABOR PRODUCTS FROM THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: RE-EXAMINING U.S.
ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 307 OF THE TRADE AND
TARIFF ACT OF 1930
Sarah A. Thornton
Abstract- Since 1989, the United States has engaged in a heated debate with the
People's Republic of China over products manufactured in Chinese prisons which enter
U.S. markets. Human rights advocates argue that conditions in China's prisons violate
human rights principles, and therefore, the United States should not extend Most Favored
Nation trade status to China. Others argue that human rights conditions will only
improve if the United States continues to extend MFN privileges. Forgotten is section
307 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibits imports of products made from
prison labor. To effectively address the prison labor issue with China, the United States
should remove the issue from the human rights debate and focus on improved
enforcement of section 307.
I. INTRODUCTION
After the 1989 massacre of Beijing residents in Tiananmen Square,
prisons in the People's Republic of China ("PRC") swelled with political
dissidents.' The increased number of people imprisoned for their
opposition to the PRC's political regime led to an outcry from the United
States and the international community, and to closer scrutiny of official
conduct in Chinese prisons. 2 Under this increased scrutiny, the U.S.
government and international human rights groups found that Chinese
prisoners, including political prisoners, were working -in a prison system
which profited by exporting prison labor products to foreign countries,
including the United States.3 Companies which imported these products
into the U.S. violated section 307 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930
(hereinafter section 307).4 These findings led to calls for sanctions against
China for human rights abuses, and for increased enforcement of section
307.
1 Prison Labor in China, Asia Watch, Apr. 19, 1991, at 1, 3; LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE wrT CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: CHINA'S CRIMINAL PROCESS AND
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 73 (1993) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITTEE].
2 See Prison Labor in China, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1989).
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At the same time, the Chinese economy was rapidly expanding and
the Chinese government was opening its doors to foreign investors. The
PRC was becoming an important Pacific economy, playing a large role as a
supplier of manufactured goods.5  Between 1980 and 1991, Chinese
merchandise exports quadrupled, surpassing $70 billion.6 In order to stay
competitive in the global economy, it was necessary for the U.S. to enter
and remain in the Chinese market.7 The political climate, however, made
this task very difficult.
After the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Bush administration began
a "constructive policy of engagement with China".8  Congressional
opposition to this policy led to an intense debate over whether the U.S.
should continue to extend Most Favored Nation ("MFN") trading status to
China.9 Opponents of MFN cited the import of prison labor products in
violation of U.S. law as a key reason not to renew MFN.10 In 1991 the Bush
administration negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") with
China, which called on the PRC to take steps to halt the export of prison
labor products. II At the same time, the administration hoped that the MOU
would appease opponents of China's MEN status. Despite token
concessions, the PRC did not for the most part comply with the MOU, and
the battle over MEN for China continued through June of 1994.
In 1993, President Clinton renewed China's MFN status on a condi-
tional basis. 12 The Clinton administration maintained that it wanted to see
improvement of human rights abuses in China before MFN would be
granted again.13 Among other things, the extension required that the PRC
comply with the bilateral MOU negotiated by the Bush administration
before MFN would be renewed.14 The battle over this conditional status
5 OECD DEVELOPMENT CENTRE, CHINA AS A LEADING PACIFIC ECONOMY 25 (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development Working Paper Vol. 1, No. 11, 1993) [hereinafter OECD].
6 Id. at 11.
7 Diane F. Orefitlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human
Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 66, 76 (1993).
8 Id. at 73.
9 ld at 74.
10 Id.
11 Arnold Kanter, Prohibiting the Import and Export of Chinese Prison Labor Products, Statement at
the Signing of the Chinese Prison Labor Memorandum of Understanding (Aug. 7, 1992), in 3 U.S. DEP'T
ST. DISPATCH 660 (1992).
12 Exec. Order No. 12,850, 3 C.F.R. 606-607 (1994).
13 Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China, 29 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 982
(May 28, 1993).
14 Exec. Order No. 12,850, supra note 12, at § 1(a).
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was fierce, with China demanding that the U.S. not interfere with its internal
affairs. 15 The U.S. business community also launched a very strong lobby
in favor of MFN status for China. 16 During these debates, China went on a
"buying frenzy" and placed over $2 billion dollars of orders with U.S.
industries.17 This made it very clear to the U.S. government that despite
concerns with prison labor and human rights, China was an extremely
important trading partner, and the fragile U.S. economy could ill-afford to
jeopardize that relationship.
During the summer of 1994, China's MFN status was again
considered for renewal. Despite evidence of little improvement in areas
listed in the 1993 Executive Order, President Clinton elected to separate
human rights issues from the issue of MFN renewal, and granted MFN
status to the PRC. 18 While this decision departed sharply from the
administration's position in 1993, the president believed that it would be in
the best interest of both countries if the issue of MFN was not linked to
human rights.19 Yet despite claims that the PRC has complied with the
MOU, the problem of prison labor imports into the U.S. remains. As
recently as October 1994, reports have been made of PRC prisoners
manufacturing goods intended for U.S. markets.20 Importing these products
into the U.S. still violates U.S. laws. This Comment argues that the prison
labor issue should be divorced from the human rights issue entirely, but that
enforcement of section 307 should still be a top U.S. priority.
First, this Comment will examine the production system in the PRC
prisons. It will outline the organization and hierarchy of that system,
discussing the unique profit motive operating within the system. The
organization of PRC prisons allows the material well-being of prison
administrators to depend on the prisoners' level of production.
Next, this Comment will discuss section 307 of the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act of 1930 and the various measures the U.S. has used to enforce it.
Imports of prison labor products from the PRC violate the letter and spirit of
15 Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 7, at 72.
16 Id. at 75-76.
17 Id.
18 H.R. DOC. No. 266, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); The President's News Conference, 30 WKLY.
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1167 (May 26, 1994).
19 Elaine Sciolino, Clinton and China: How Promise Self-Destructed, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1994, at
Al.
20 See Pamela Burdman, Made in China can be Made in Jail, S. F. CHRON., Oct. 5, 1994, at A10.
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section 307, yet Customs enforcement, the MOU, and MFN have been
unsuccessful in stopping the practice and the imports.
Finally, this Comment will argue for an alternative to the use of MFN
as a means of enforcing section 307. While prison labor production in the
PRC has been linked to human rights abuses in the public's eye, prison
labor itself is not per se illegal.21 International law provides that prisoners
should in fact perform work.22 However, U.S. law that prohibits importing
prison labor products was intended to protect U.S. industries, not further
human rights goals. Because of the profit motive present in PRC prisons,
enforcement of section 307 is a legitimate concern of the U.S. While the
U.S. has been unsuccessful in changing practices within the PRC, the
government could be more successful if it focused on policies and areas
within its direct control. This Comment will argue that the enactment of a
voluntary code of conduct would greatly assist U.S. agencies to enforce
section 307.
II. FORCED LABOR EXPORT PRODUCTION IN CHINA
The Chinese prison labor system is a complex, confusing
organization. Before a person may be sentenced to perform labor, they
must go through either a criminal or administrative process. Criminal
offenders receive a sentence from a judge, according to PRC criminal
laws.23  In contrast, administrative sentences are approved by the
"Committee on Reeducation through Labor", which consists of personnel
from the judiciary, Civil Administration, Public Security Bureau, and
provincial labor departments.24 Yet both the criminal system and the
administrative system are similar in that people punished under either
system must produce goods in a Labor Reform Enterprise ("LRE").25
21 See generally Jonathan M. Cowen, One Nation's "Gulag" is Another Nation's "Factory within a
Fence": Prison-Labor in the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, 12 PAC. BASIN
L.J. 190, 194 (1993) (for a general comparison of prison systems in the U.S. and PRC); Prison Labor in
China, supra note 1.
22 Prison Labor in China, supra note 1.
23 Joseph Zhou, The Chinese Correctional System and its Development, 15 INT'L J. COMP. &
APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 15, 17 (1991).
24 Id at 17-18.
25 LAWYERS COMMITEE, supra note 1, at 71. Goods produced include manufactured goods from
factories, mining, and farm production. HONGDA HARRY Wu, LAOGAI: THE CHINESE GULAG 5, 44 (Ted
Slingerland trans., 1992).
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Although there are no exact numbers, between sixteen and twenty million
people work in these labor camps.26
The guiding principles behind both systems emphasize reform first
and production second.27 However, in recent years the goal of profit has
come to guide the Labor Reform Enterprise system. Despite professing an
emphasis on reform, the PRC government has encouraged LRE's to
embrace the goal of profit and expand into foreign markets.28 These
Enterprises now play an important role in the Chinese export economy and
national economic planning.29
A. Organization and Hierarchy of the Chinese Prison Labor System.
Labor Reform Enterprises are divided into three distinct units:
Convicted Labor Reform ("CLR"),30 Reeducation Through Labor ("RTL"),
and Forced Job Placement ("FJP").31 The Enterprises follow military
organization and are grouped into detachments.32 The Detachments are
comprised of any combination of RTL, FJP, or CLR units. 33 Detachment
leaders are responsible for production, as well as political education and
reform of prisoners.34 Detachments follow the broad economic and reform
policies of the central Chinese government, but they are independently
responsible for their own financing, production schedules, accounting, and
26 Wu, supra note 25, at 6. But see Zhou, supra note 23, at 19 (placing the figure at a much more
conservative 2 million).
27 The criminal process emphasizes "'reform first and production second' whereas the administrative
process emphasizes 'reeducation first and production second."' Both philosophies are central to the
Chinese corrections system, where rehabilitation is a primary objective, and every citizen is capable of
being reformed into a usefil member of society. Zhou, supra note 23, at 17, 18.
28 Prison Labor in China, supra note 1, at 3; see also Ding Banghua, Thoughts on Developing a
Foreign-oriented Economy by Labor Reform Enterprises, ASIA WATCH, Apr. 19, 1991 at 8, 9 ("[A]s the
express aim is to improve reform work and increase economic benefits, it becomes all the more reasonable
for the labor reform enterprises to develop a foreign-oriented economy.") (Banghua was a member of the
Labor Reform Bureau, Jiangsu Province); Forced Labor Exports from China: Update No. 1, ASIA WATCH,
Sept. 19, 1991, at 1, 2.
29 Wu, supra note 25, at 5.
30 Id at 1. This is also called "reform through labor." Zhou, supra note 23, at 17. For purposes of
clarity, in order to distinguish this unit from "reeducation through labor", it will be referred to as CI.R
throughout this comment.P1 WU, supra note 25, at 6; Cowen, supra note 21, at 194.
32 Wu, supra note 25, at 10; He Liang, The Path is Under Our Feet, ASIA WATCH, Apr. 19, 1991, at
12 (an "obvious advantage" of RTL units is that workers are "young, concentrated; they cost less and they
follow a military routine.").
33 WU, supra note 25, at 12.
34 Id. at 10.
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other day-to-day operations. 35 The Enterprises "should be established
according to the needs of provincial, autonomous regional, and municipal
people's governments ... however, records must be filed with the Public
Security Bureau. '36 They have been given this free reign by the central
government to encourage economic success of the Enterprises. 37
While prisoners from any LRE unit work together in the detachments,
there are significant differences between prisoners in CLR, RTL, and FJP
units. CLR units include prisoners who have gone through the criminal
process and have been sentenced to disciplinary production camps. 38 CLR
units are reserved for serious criminal offenders who are serving sentences
imposed on them by a court.39 The prisoners work in "reform through
labor"40 and receive no wages for their work.41 While the most serious
offenders are committed strictly to prisons, there is virtually no difference
between a prison and a disciplinary production camp.42 Eighty-seven
percent of convicted criminals go to production camps, of which there are
approximately 600.43 There are an unknown number of secret prisons as
well.44
In contrast, Reeducation Through Labor is an administrative sanction,
involving "extrajudicial punishment [and] imprisonment for up to three
years. '45 The purpose of the RTL units is to educate and reform people
who violate the "social order."4 6 While these units are portrayed as
"educational organizations," they are actually under the direction of the
Chinese Public Security Bureau.47 There is no judicial process for people
35 Id.
36 Wu, supra note 25, at II (quoting Experimental Methods in Reeducation Through Labor (Chinese
Communist Party internal doc., Jan. 21, 1982)).
37 Prison Labor in China, supra note 1, at 1.
38 Zhou, supra note 23, at 17; WU, supra note 25, at 8.
39 Wu, supra note 25, at 13; Prison Labor in China, supra note 1, at 4.
40 This is different than re-education through labor. Reform is applied to convicted criminals, while
reeducation applies to people who aren't considered serious criminals, but who have resisted social reform.
See Wu, supra note 25, at 81; see also LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note I, at 71. Emphasis on Reform
Through Labor comes from the Chinese belief that "'every person is capable of being reformed' under
certain conditions." Zhou, supra note 23, at 17.
41 Cowen, supra note 21, at 195.
42 Wu, supra note 25, at 8.
43 Id. at 8, 11.
44 Id. at 8.
45 Prison Labor in China, supra note 1, at 4 n.5; LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 71; Zhou,
supra note 23, at 17.
46 Zhou, supra note 23, at 17.
47 Wu, supra note 25, at 12, 13.
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assigned to these units, and they are referred to as "personnel," not
"criminals. '48 Early RTL policies recognized the sentence as "job place-
ment" and not as punishment.49 'Officially there is a three year term limit on
RTL personnel, but this is seldom adhered to.50 Personnel may also remain
in RTL for "poor behavior."51 The biggest difference between CLR and
RTL is that RTL "personnel" do receive a salary for their work.52 The
government, however, deducts food, clothes, shoes, and necessities, leaving
the RTL personnel in a financial position similar to CLR prisoners. 53
The last unit in the system is Forced Job Placement. FJP means that
at the end of an RTL term, a prisoner must continue to perform forced labor,
usually in a Labor Reform Enterprise.54 Before 1980, FJP was only applied
to CLR prisoners because RTL sentences had no fixed term; now, because
RTL terms are limited to three years, FJP is applied to prisoners in both
units.55 The length of FJP terms is indefinite.56 FJP is usually attached to
sentences of prisoners who are "unrepentant." The dual purpose of FJP is to
remove people from society at large, and to maintain the productivity in
Labor Reform Enterprises.57
Labor Reform Enterprises are not easily distinguished from regular
production facilities. 58 All LREs have a prison designation and an alternate
production name.59 Normally, only the name of the production unit, not the
48 Id at 94.
49 Id. at 97.
50 For example, personnel at the Tuanhe Farm (LRC-03-1 I) were told by the Beijing Public Security
Bureau after serving their terms that it was "a political necessity" that they be kept as RTL personnel until
higher authorities allowed their release. The length of extension was not specified, and the personnel were
later moved into Forced Job Placement. Id at 97-98; see also LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note I, at 74.
51 This includes "refusing to acknowledge guilt, resisting reform, violating rules, not submitting to
discipline, passive work attitude, etc." Wu, supra note 25, at 98 (citing Article 58 of the CCP internal
document "Experimental Methods in Reeducation Through Labor").
52 Zhou, supra note 23, at 18; Wu, supra note 25, at 99.
53 In China's prison labor system, CLR prisoners receive only 2-5 yuan a month in bonuses, which
are not given to each worker. The prison provides food and clothing. In contrast, RTL prisoners receive
between 13 and 47 yuan a month in salary, and 3 to 5 yuan a month in bonuses. However, food, clothing,
sick leave, and other expenses are deducted from this salary. Wu, supra note 25, at 100.
54 Id. at 14.
55 Id. at 13, 14.
56 Cowen, supra note 21, at 199; Wu, supra note 25, at 113. "'Reeducatees' are often held in the
same camps as formal criminals... [and] as in the case of individuals sentenced criminally to 'Reform
Through Labor,' they may be subject to de facto extension of their sentences beyond the formal period."
LAWYERS COMMITtEE, supra note 1, at 74.
57 Prison Labor in China, supra note 1, at 1, 2.
58 WU, supra note 25, at 9.
59 Id
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Enterprise, is displayed. 60 The production unit name is used externally,
especially for business purposes and with foreign visitors. The prison
designation is used internally, by the government. 61 This dual designation
makes it very difficult for outside observers to know if what they are seeing
is an independent production facility, or a Labor Reform Enterprise using
prison labor.
B. Production in Labor Reform Enterprises
Labor Reform Enterprises are an important part of the national export
economy in China.62 During the 1954 Communist General Assembly,
Public Security Ministry chief Luo Ruiqing stated that labor reform was an
"effective method of purging and eliminating all criminals," while at the
same time it "aid[ed] in the development of the nation's industries," saved
money, and was a "dependable source of wealth. '63 The central PRC
Government has encouraged LREs to enter foreign markets and establish
joint ventures with international businesses. LREs are considered
successful if they earn foreign currency.64 In 1991, the low estimate of
prison labor exports per year was $100 million.65
The national government has encouraged LREs to be more effective
economically, which has lead to the practice of attaching reform success to
profit. 66 In 1980, the national government created a dual responsibility sys-
tem for prison labor. Under this system, LREs must meet individual
achievement indexes for both prisoner reform and production. While profit-
able, this has lead to an increased emphasis on production and a de-
emphasis on the well-being of prisoners. 67
60 Id. at 41-42.
61 Id.
62 John M. Klofas, Considering People in Context: The Case of the People's Republic of China, 15
INT'L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 175, 177 (1991); WU, supra note 25, at 35; Prison Labor in China,
supra note 1, at 3. China's emergence in the world market can be seen as that of a major supplier of labor
intensive products. OECD, supra note 5, at 13.
63 WU, supra note 25, at 34.
64 Id. at 32, 34; Prison Labor in China, supra note 1, at 3. With the growth of merchandise exports,
foreign investment has come to play a key role in economic development. OECD, supra note 5, at 13.
5 China's Ugly Export Secret: Prison Labor, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 22, 1991, at 42 [hereinafter China's
Ugly Export Secret].
66 WU, supra note 25, at 32.
67 Id at 30.
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In the LREs, the quality and quantity of a prisoner's output indicates
the level of reform a prisoner has achieved.68 Under regulations, prisoners
may receive praise or rewards for good work.69 They may also receive pun-
ishment for bad work.70 Not meeting a daily quota means that the prisoner
is guilty of not following directions, or of having a "lazy attitude towards
work." 71 Often, prisoner's food rations and wages are linked to quality and
quantity of production.72 These rations are directly controlled by security
personnel. 73 Other sanctions include denying visits, withholding wages,
and confinement and punishment.74
Because of this organization and the relative autonomy of the LREs,
the material well-being of the security personnel and the prisoners is
directly linked to the profitability of the LRE. 75 An undisclosed percentage
of money earned by the LRE goes to the central government in the form of
taxes and fees.76 After that, money is allocated at-will by the LRE.7 7
Usually, over forty percent of the money goes in the form of bonuses to
security personnel and other management; prisoners receive little or no
material benefit from the earnings of the Enterprise.78
Thus, under this system, the more merchandise a worker produces,
the more money the Enterprise makes. The enterprise earnings then benefit
the security personnel, giving them direct incentive to get more and better
quality products out of prisoners. With the implementation of FJP, and the
virtual ability to keep a prisoner in a LRE indefinitely, there is much more
incentive to keep a good, talented worker in production once his or her term
is complete.79 This system has, therefore, led to cheaper labor for foreign
businesses, cheaper products for consumers, and increasing abuse of prison
68 Id. at 35. The principles behind the corrections system combines punishment and control with
thought reform, and labor and production with political education. Prisoners learn new skills which might
assist with their rehabilitation and contribute to their own keep by producing goods of economic value.
Zhou, supra note 23, at 17.
69 WU, supra note 25, at 36.
70 Id at 36-37.
71 Id. at 36.
72 Id at 37.
73 Id
74 Id




79 Prison Labor in China, supra note 1, at 2; Zhou, supra note 23, at 74.
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laborers by forcing them to work in LRE's beyond their prescribed
sentences.80
C. Exports and Imports to the United States
On a larger scale, it is the prerogative of the LREs to establish
relations with foreign businesses for export. They are encouraged to do so,
although the PRC has denied this.81 The areas of China in which economic
reform is most advanced are also the areas which are most actively engaged
in prison labor export, especially in the coastal provinces.82 The LREs in
these regions "are allowed to take advantage of their location in the coastal
areas... to gather information [from foreign companies]. ' '83
In the past few years, there have been several instances where the
U.S. discovered that products made by Chinese prison labor were entering
its borders.84 For example, in 1990, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
discovered that prison labor was being used to assemble boxes for wine
coolers.85 Additionally, it was discovered that grapes for Dynasty Wine
were harvested by prison labor between 1982 and 1985, and found their way
into the U.S. market.8 6 In 1992, the U.S. Customs Service banned Red Star
Tea Farm products because they were made with prison labor.87 The
Shanghai Laodong Steel Pipe Works, also Shanghai No.7 Labor Reform
80 See Cowen, supra note 21, at 225-226; see also Wu, supra note 25, at 110.
81 In an October 5, 1990 letter to the New York Times, Chen Defu, Press Counselor of the Chinese
Embassy in Washington wrote, "Labor reform departments are not allowed to engage in foreign economic
and trade activities, and China has never granted any labor reform department a permit to engage in foreign
trade. No products made in prison are exported." Yet an article in a "restricted circulation" journal for
Chinese prison officials says, "Since 1987, when production and export became integrated, the export
authorities have energetically helped our mill develop into a base for export." Prison Labor in China,
supra note I, at 1. The transformation of China to a market economy has given local authorities and firms
increasing opportunities for making economic decisions on their own initiative. OECD, supra note 5, at
16.
82 Prison Labor in China, supra note I, at 3. The 1984-1985 trade reforms opened trade in 14
coastal cities. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is heavily concentrated in coastal cities. OECD, supra note
5, at 17, 20.
83 China's Ugly Export Secret, supra note 65, at 42; Prison Labor in China, supra note 1, at 3.
Attracting FDI has been a main objective of China's economic reforms since 1978. OECD, supra note 5,
at 19.
84 Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 7, at 74.
85 China's Ugly Export Secret, supra note 65.
86 WU, supra note 25, at 38, 39; China's Ugly Export Secret, supra note 65.
87 James Gerstenzang & Rone Tempest, China Opens Prisons to US. Inspection to Help Resolve
Trade Conflict, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, at A]2.
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Detachment, presented a promotional brochure in 1991, describing how
their "product has been exported to regions in South-east Asia, Middle Asia,
South America ... U.S.A., Japan and West Germany."88
The nature of the production system makes it very difficult for the
U.S. government and businesses to know if import products are being sup-
plied by an LRE or a legitimate business. U.S. companies often place
orders with foreign buying agents for goods made in China. These agents
then make deals with a Chinese shipper, who contacts a different supplier.
The supplier in China then hires subcontractors, and prisons usually make
the lowest bid.89 Thus, it is difficult for U.S. companies to know who
actually manufactures the products they order. In addition to this problem,
LRE's have double names; one is a prison designation, and one is used to
conduct business. 90 Combined with the fact that "other Chinese factories
are also making goods identical to those in the prison factory,"91 it is very
difficult for the government and businesses to identify where their products
originate.
Im. APPLICABLE U.S. LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
U.S. law requires that the government address the problem of prison
labor imports from China. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 expressly
prohibits the importing of prison labor products into this country.
Businesses which knowingly violate this law are subject to penalties and
fines.
A. US. Law: Section 307 of The Smoot-Hawley TariffAct of 1930
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 was enacted to create a level
playing field between U.S. industries and foreign competitors.92 Section
307 of the Act applies directly to the import of prison labor products from
abroad. It states: "All goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined,
88 Forced Labor from China: Update No. 1, supra note 28, at 2; see also Forced Labor from China:
Update No. 2, ASIA WATCH, Nov. 15, 1991, at 1, 1-9 (giving more examples of LRE products being
offered to or having entered the U.S.).
89 China's Ugly Export Secret, supra note 65, at 42.
90 Prison Labor in China, supra note 1.
91 Id.; China's Ugly Export Secret, supra note 65.
92 H.R. REP. No. 2590, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (193 1); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1989).
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produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by
convict labor under penal sanctions shall not be entitled to entry at any of
the ports of the United States, and the importation thereof is hereby
prohibited .... -93
As applied to this section, the act defines "forced labor" as "all work
or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any
penalty for its nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer
himself voluntarily." 94 Products manufactured in LREs fit under the
definitions in this act, as the prisoners are "under penal sanction," goods are
produced "under menace of penalty," and prisoners do not offer themselves
voluntarily to perform the work.95
Section 307 was not intended to address human rights issues. The
"principle of the legislation is that the free labor of America shall not be
subjected to the burden of competition with non-free labor abroad. '96
Further language in section 307 reads: "[I]n no case shall such provisions
be applicable to goods, wares, articles, or merchandise so mined, produced,
or manufactured which are not ... manufactured in such quantities as to
meet the consumptive demands of the United States." 97  This language
indicates that Congress did not want cheaply produced prison labor goods
competing with U.S. products. These goods are allowed to enter only if
U.S. industry cannot meet the demand. Thus, this statute was designed to
promote fair trade competition between the U.S. and other countries.
However, recent invocation of section 307 has been in the context of human
rights violations in prisons, as well as fair trade.98
Persons within the jurisdiction of the U.S. face criminal penalties if
they violate section 307. Whoever knowingly transports into the United
93 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1989).
94 Id
95 It is arguable that the sentences handed down through the administrative process are not "penal"
because there is no criminal judicial process involved. However, administrative sanctions should be con-
sidered "penal" under section 307 because the sentences are punishment and their goal is reform of the
prisoner. In addition, because prisoners with both criminal and administrative sentences work in the same
production units, it would be impossible to differentiate between goods for section 307 enforcement
purposes.
96 H.R. REP. No. 2590, supra note 92.
97 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1989).
98 See generally Prison Labor in China, supra note 1; sources cited supra note 88; Acting
Commissioner Outlines Strategy for Clinton Goal of 'Level Playing Field', 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 409
(Mar. 10, 1993) (continued enforcement efforts against China to bar importation of prison made goods
would implement the Clinton administration's goal of"ensur[ing] a level playing field.").
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States any goods, wares, or merchandise produced by convicts from any
foreign country can be fined up to $50,000 and be imprisoned up to two
years.99 Customs is in charge of enforcing these provisions by turning
violators over to the U.S. Attorney for further proceedings.100
U.S. efforts to enforce section 307 have been largely unsuccessful.
The U.S. has tried direct enforcement, negotiating with China, and threat of
withdrawal of MEN, but none of these tactics has worked. The U.S. needs
to establish a new policy to effectively deal with the problem and address
U.S. interests.
B. Applying U.S. Law and Defining the US. Interest
The prison labor issue is complicated for the United States because
Congress and the public view it as both a trade and a human rights issue.
The imprisonment of political dissidents, the punishment and torture, and
the indefinite length of sentences make it a human rights issue, and it is
presented to the American public as such. 10 1 Yet section 307 is a trade law,
designed to level the playing field for U.S. industries, and it is the one
unquestionably legitimate ground that the U.S. has for becoming involved
in the prison labor problem. 102 The prison labor problem is a trade issue, in
that prisoners receive low wages, and the incentive system used in the LREs
makes prison labor products extremely cheap to produce. 103 This incentive
system goes to the heart of what section 307 was intended to prevent. Yet
the rationale given by the U.S., both at the legislative and executive level,
for application of these fair trade laws on the prison labor issue has been
99 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1989).
100 19 C.F.R. § 161.3 (1994).
101 Chinese Forced Labor Exports: Hearings Before the House Foreign Aff. Comm., 103d Cong.,
I st Sess., reprinted in Fed. News Serv., Sept. 9, 1993 (statement of Rep. Gejdenson), available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, FEDNEW File ("[T]o subject these prisoners of conscience to forced labor and to export
these products to the United States is a violation of internationally recognized human rights, as well as U.S.
law."); see also Mike Jendrzejczyk, No Waffling on China, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1993, at A13
("[President Clinton] should send a strong, unambiguous signal to China's leaders that they can expect a
renewal of MFN trade status only if there are substantial human rights improvements."); Gerstenzang &
Tempest, supra note 87.
102 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1989); see also Acting Commissioner Outlines Strategy for Clinton Goal of
'Level Playing Field', 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 409 (Mar. 10, 1993).
103 Many countries around the world, including the U.S. make products with prison labor which are
exported. Those prisoners, however, are guaranteed a certain standard of living in the penal system,
regardless of the success of production. Prisoners are also guaranteed procedural safeguards. These are
the key factors which differentiate the system in China. Cowen, supra note 21, at 235.
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human rights.104 This has lead to a very unclear definition of what the U.S.
interest is in this situation, and what the proper policy should be.
1. Section 307 and Customs Regulations
The import of PRC prison labor products into the United States
directly violates section 307 of the Trade Act of 1930.105 The definition of
prison labor products includes parts of entire products which may be made
in China by prison labor and assembled elsewhere. The punishment for
violation of this Act, however, falls on companies which "knowingly"
import these goods.106 Thus, the job of Customs to enforce this Act is
twofold: first, it must determine which goods are made by prison labor and
bar them from entering the U.S. Second, it must determine if the company
importing the good did so "knowingly." With existing enforcement
mechanisms, both tasks are nearly impossible to carry out.107
In order to determine if a product is made by prison labor, Customs
must be able to determine the point of origin of the good, and inspect the
production site. First, it is extremely difficult to determine point of origin.
The web of agents, shippers, suppliers, and sub-contractors discussed in
Section I easily hide a product's point of origin. 108 Second, as the LRE's
have alternate production and prison names, it is difficult to know if a prod-
uct is manufactured with prison labor simply by looking at the name of its
point of origin.109 Thus, in order to make accurate determinations, Customs
104 Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 7, at 73; see also Exec. Order No. 12,850, supra note 12.
105 Section 307 includes "all goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, ormanufac-
tured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor under penal sanctions." 19 U.S.C. § 1307
(198t06 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1989).
107 The procedure for Customs when dealing with section 307 violations is as follows: Ifa customs
official reasonably believes a product entering the U.S. was produced by prison labor, he or she must
submit a report stating (I) the reasons behind that belief, (2) a description or sample of the merchandise,
(3) all obtainable facts as to the manufacture of the product abroad, and (4) 'detailed description of the
consumption of the product in the U.S. 19 C.F.R. § 12.42 (a), (b) (1994) (emphasis added).
After the report is filed, the Customs Commissioner may order an investigation "as appears to be
warranted by the circumstances of the case." The Commissioner may consider "any representations offered
by foreign interests or domestic producers." 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(c) (1994).
"If information available reasonably but not conclusively indicates that merchandise [under section
307] is about to be imported.... district directors shall thereupon withhold release of any such merchan-
dise .... 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(e) (1994). Customs reports violations of this law to the U.S. Attorney. 19
C.F.R. § 161.3 (1994).
108 See discussion infra part 11.
109 Wu, supra note 25, at 9.
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must have access to facilities. Such access, however, has been strictly
limited.
China has granted U.S. officials speedy access to some facilities, and
has also invited inspectors to others, without a request of inspection. 110 But
these are described as "model" facilities, and do not lead the inspectors to
any violations."'l The Chinese government often delays requested access to
facilities or to documents which indicate a product's destination."l
2
Without cooperation and access to these documents and facilities, Customs
can not accurately determine whether or not a product is made with prison
labor. From the thousands of LREs which reportedly exist, Customs only
finds a handful of violations every year.113
Under the current system, Customs enforcement of U.S. law has had
only a nominal effect on the problem. Without sufficient personnel, and
adequate access to facilities, Customs is unable to stop the importation of
these products. Recognizing the inadequacy of the current system, the U.S.
has pursued other means of enforcement.
2. Memorandum of Understanding and Diplomacy
Besides direct implementation of section 307, the U.S. has sought to
solve the prison labor problem through diplomatic means. In 1992, the U.S.
and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding.114 The MOU provides
that each party promptly investigate suspected violations, and immediately
report the result of the investigations." 15 It also calls for the exchange of
information by both sides, and provides access to U.S. officials to "suspect
110 Gerstenzang & Tempest, supra note 87.
I11 Id
112 Id.
113 See generally Determination that Merchandise Imported from the People's Republic of China,
Produced by Red Star Tea Farm, is Being Produced by Convict, Forced, or Indentured Labor, 26 Cust. B.
& Dec. 212 (1992); Determination that Merchandise Imported from the People's Republic of China;
Manufactured by Xuzhou Forging and Pressing Machine Works is being Produced by Convict, Forced or
Indentured Labor, 26 Cust. B. & Dec. 251 (1992); Determination that Merchandise Imported from the
People's Republic of China is being Produced with Convict, Forced, or Indentured Labor by the Qinghai
Hide and Garment Factory, 27 Cust. B. & Dec. 25 (1992); Determination that Maintenance of
Determination/Finding of July 7, 1992. Pertaining to Certain Socks Importedfrom the PRC is no Longer
Necessary, 27 Cust. B. & Dec. 52 (1993).
114 Kanter, supra note 11.
115 Id
FEB. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Chinese facilities."116 The MOU makes it easier for Customs to determine
first-hand if suspected goods were made with prison labor.
The MOU was intended to supplement and aid current customs
enforcement of section 307. Yet the MOU has not been successfully imple-
mented. There has been no "swift and open verification" and members of
Congress have criticized the agreement as "meaningless." 117 Since the
MOU was signed, Customs presented thirty-one cases to the PRC for
investigation.118 Of sixteen reports that China later provided, China
maintained that eleven facilities do not export their products, or do not
export to the U.S.119 On August 25, 1992, Customs requested visits to five
sites, under the MOU, but was able to visit only one.120 While requests to
visit the others have been rejected, China has provided access to two
facilities Customs did not request to inspect. 121 In January 1994, U.S.
Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen said China agreed to allow five more
sites to be inspected, but that oral agreement has not yet been put in
writing.122
Further diplomatic efforts have been unsuccessful in substantively
implementing the MOU. A Chinese delegation visited the U.S. in the Fall
of 1993. Secretary of the Treasury Bentsen traveled to China in January
1994, as did Secretary of State Warren Christopher in March 1994.123
While Bentsen's visit did result in the oral agreement of five inspections,
Christopher's visit was not nearly as successful. 124 The visit was character-
ized as "frosty" and the PRC declared that it would not take "orders on
human rights."'125 During the visit, however, China signed ajoint statement
116 Id
117 U.S.-China Trade Relations: Prepared Testimony of Christopher H. Smith Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Fed.
News Serv., Feb. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, FEDNEW File.
118 Chinese Forced Labor Exports: Hearings Before the House Foreign Aff. Comm., supra note
101 (testimony of Winston Lord, Assisstant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 ld.; see also Rich Miller, Bentsen Says China Agrees New Prison Labour Checks, Reuter Asia-
Pacific Bus. Rep., Jan. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, REUAPB File.122 Miller, supra note 121; China Filing to Meet MFN Prison Labor Conditions, Agence France
Presse, Mar. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, AFP File.123 Christopher Offered Easier Terms to China in Return for MFN Compliance, Agence France
Presse, Mar. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, AFP File.
124 Id
125 Id.
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with the U.S., again agreeing to implement the MOU which was signed two
years earlier 126
Despite slow progress implementing the MOU, President Clinton
found that China's compliance was sufficient to warrant extension of MFN
trading privileges. 127 Yet the history of its problematic enforcement and
recent allegations of non-compliance indicate that China is not
implementing the MOU. 128 In Congressional hearings, the role of this
"quiet diplomacy" has been criticized as ineffective.129
The overall effect of the MOU, therefore, has been face-value coop-
eration from China. The agreement has not been substantially implemented,
almost two years after being signed. In March 1994, China agreed to imple-
ment the MOU, with the intent that this might give the U.S. government
enough political leeway to renew MFN during the summer. The success of
the MOU has been only as a token effort, and has not led to any substantial
end to the export of prison labor products.
Although the MOU has been largely ineffective, it should not be
abandoned. While not directly enforceable, it has symbolic value, and can
serve as a backbone to further agreements. In addition, it does provide the
U.S. with an additional basis for demanding that China stop manufacturing
prison labor products intended for U.S. markets. However, on its own, the
MOU is not effective. In order to be successfully implemented or have any
value at all, it must be supported by other actions.
3.. MFN as a Sanction
On May 28, 1993, President Clinton signed an executive order which
placed China's Most Favored Nation trading status on conditional one year
extension. 130 In order to have MFN renewed in July of 1994, China would
have to make significant progress on human rights, and the use of prison
labor.131 In order to secure MFN, China made some human rights conces-
126 H.R. DoC. No. 266, supra note 18, at 5-6.
127 Id
128 Id at6.
129 Chinese Forced Labor Exports: Hearings Before the House Foreign Aff. Comm., supra note
101 (testimony of Winston Lord, Assisstant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs).
130 Exec. Order No. 12,850, supra note 12; President Clinton Extends MFN to China, but Sets
Conditions on Renewal Next Year, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 886 (June 2, 1993).
131 President Clinton Extends MEN to China; but Sets Conditions on Renewal Next Year, supra
note 130, at 886.
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sions, including the release of ten political dissidents from prison, and also
purchased $2 billion of U.S. goods.132 On June 2, 1994, Mr. Clinton
renewed MEN trading status for China.133
The conditional renewal in 1993 and 1994, followed an intense
debate between law makers, human rights organizations, and business
leaders over whether or not the use of MFN was proper to address this
problem. The conditional renewal followed years of Congressional fights
with the Bush administration, who did not place any conditions on China's
MFN. President Bush maintained that, "adding broad sanctions to China's
MFN renewal would not lead to faster progress in advancing our goals."134
That policy was followed in order to "permit the United States to exercise
greater influence over China, while not causing economic disruption for
reform-minded Chinese or U.S. workers who depend on China trade for
employment."135  While President Clinton purported to support human
rights goals, in 1994 he could not gamble on the importance of China to the
U.S. economy.
There is a split of opinion among policy makers (even within the
Clinton administration itself) over whether MFN should be used to secure
human rights improvements.136 Some policy makers believe that MFN
should not address human rights issues. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to
the Trade Act of 1974 specifically states that non-market economies must
meet freedom of emigration requirements, or have them waived by the
president, in order to have MFN status renewed every year.137 The
President may waive the conditions, but he must report his decision to
Congress.138 Yet the preamble to this statute says that a purpose of condi-
tional MEN is "[t]o assure the continued dedication of the United States to
132 Id
133 H.R. Doc. No. 266, supra note 18, at 13.
134 President Vetoes Bill to Condition China's MFN Status, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1682 (Sept.
30, 1992).
13' Id
136 See S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 9, 1994, (Sunday Edition), at 10, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, SCHINA File.
137 President Clinton Extends MFN to China, but Sets Conditions on Renewal Next Year, supra
note 130, at 886; Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard Legal
Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1204 (1987); Trade Act of 1974 § 402, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1989). Most
Favored Nation trading status is governed by this section of the Trade Act of 1974, known as the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment. This section dictates the terms under which the President may extend MFN to non-
market economies.
138 Carter, supra note 137, at 1205.
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fundamental human rights.. .,139 The preamble suggests that furtherance
of human rights is a goal of the policy. However, despite the language of
the preamble, the statute only grants specific power to address emigration
issues, not human rights.
Consistent with the language of the preamble and the statute, China's
MFN was conditioned subject to both emigration and improvement in
human rights issues. It was also conditioned on an improvement in the
export of prison labor products, but it is unclear if prison labor was
considered an economic issue, or if it was tied in to human rights
improvements. Some members of Congress continue to feel very strongly
that MVFN should not be renewed if China violates human rights (including
the use of prison labor), while others believe that revoking MFN would hurt
the U.S. and its workers too much, and is the wrong way to address the
problem.140 There have also been apparent disagreements within the
Clinton administration over whether or not MEN should be revoked for
these reasons. 141
Regardless of whether or not prison labor is also a human rights con-
cern for the U.S., the U.S. could never afford revoking MFN for China.
Before renewal in 1993, China spent billions of dollars on airplanes, cars,
oil exploration equipment, and telecommunications contracts with firms all
over the country.142 In return, China expected businesses to "display your
impact in the U.S. government... to maintain the MFN status with an aim
to... avoid the loss of bilateral interests. ' ' 143 The threat of retaliation over
loss of MN status is very real; the U.S. could lose billions of dollars in
investments, as well as many American jobs if China were to retaliate in
some way.144 President Clinton virtually had no choice other than to renew
MFN in 1994.145 Yet the president was bound by the language of
conditional renewal, which Congress and the public did not forget. This
scenario created a political dilemma for the administration, who tried to
139 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1989).
140 S. CHINA MORNING POST, supra note 136.
141 Id
142 See Michael Weisskopf, Backbone of the New China Lobby: U.S. Firms, WASH. POST, June 14,
1993, at Al.
143 Id
144 Id; see also S. CHINA MORNING POST, supra note 136.
145 S. CHINA MORNING POST, supra note 136.
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soften the language of conditional renewal in order the give themselves
room to renew IFN in 1994.146
Since the massacre in Tiananmen Square, the debate over MFN and
human rights, including the prison labor issue, has surfaced every year.
MFN has either been renewed, or renewed with conditions. Circumstances
have indicated, however, that the government needs to renew IFN no
matter what, regardless of the position it wants to take on human rights.
Thus, taking MEN away from China was an empty threat, damaging the
credibility of the U.S. in the eyes of the PRC. If the U.S. were ever to
revoke MEN, the American public would feel the economic effect.
Therefore, the government has backed away from using MFN as a sanction,
leaving China with no incentive for reforming the prison labor system in
order to secure MEN renewal.
The battle over MFN was costly to U.S. credibility and policy
making. Events during 1993 and 1994 have shown that the threat of
withdrawal has not lead to any concrete results in prison labor reform. The
only results have been deteriorating trade relations between the U.S. and an
important trading partner. The U.S. needs to clarify its policy towards
China, on whether the U.S. sees prison labor as a human rights or a trade
issue. As a trade issue, the U.S. has a much greater chance of securing
cooperation from the PRC, because the U.S. has legal footing in section
307. In contrast, when prison labor is tied to human rights issues, the U.S.
concern is rooted in general international principles with no grounds of
enforcement. As President Clinton has indicated, 147 the U.S. should
abandon the MEFN route completely and continue normal trade with China.
Instead, the U.S. needs to implement new policies that will have a more
direct effect of enforcing U.S. law, and not involve the country in an
emotional, circular debate. These solutions must be more than just surface-
level agreements meant to appease Congress and the public. They must
substantially improve enforcement of section 307, which means in turn that
they must have a substantive effect on the prison labor system. This
approach might end the emphasis China puts on prison labor exports in its
economy and curtail prison labor exports to the U.S.
146 Id
147 The President's News Conference, May 26, 1994, 30 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DoC. 1167 (May 30,
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IV. A CASE FOR A VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT AND OTHER
SOLUTIONS
In order to resolve the prison labor imports issue, Congress should
adopt a voluntary code of conduct tailored specifically to enforce the provi-
sions of section 307, as well as better enforcement through existing
channels as a way to curtail the prison labor import problem. This policy
would take advantage of the changing roles of international business, while
taking the pressure off of a government that inconsistently enforces
sanctions.
A. Existing Proposals For a Voluntary Code of Conduct
The idea that businesses should adopt a voluntary code of conduct
applicable to their behavior in ventures abroad has circulated among
Congress, academics, and businesses since the adoption of the Sullivan
Principles in 1977.148 A voluntary code of conduct is a non-binding set of
principles which govern the conduct of U.S. companies in their ventures
overseas, in this case in the PRC. The code would govern their investments
and give them more responsibility for curbing human rights violations in
their interests abroad. 149
In the wake of President Clinton's decision to separate the human
rights debate from the MFN debate, human rights groups have recently pro-
posed a voluntary code of conduct advocating five principles which should
be applied to China.150 The first is that companies will try not to use or pur-
chase prison labor products because conditions in PRC prisons violate
human rights standards. Second, companies should not permit compulsory
political indoctrination in the workplace. Third, companies should adopt
non-discriminatory hiring practices in the PRC, meaning that worker's
political beliefs should not be considered regarding employment. Fourth,
while operating in the PRC, companies should adopt policies of free
148 For a discussion of the applicability of the Sullivan Principles, see Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra
note 7, at 83 n.45. The article discusses the emerging responsibility of private businesses to help enforce
human rights policies. The Sullivan Principles were adopted by Congress and businesses in reaction to
apartheid in South Africa. Id at 83. While effective in that situation, many people argue that similar prin-
ciples could not be adopted in regards to China because of political and cultural differences. Edward A.
Gargan, Business Objects to Code in China, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1994, at D2.
149 Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 7, at 83.
150 Gargan, supra note 148.
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expression and association relating to work issues. Finally, senior
American executives should discuss human rights issues with local Chinese
officials.151 A key part of the voluntary code states that businesses who
adopt it must only adhere on a "best efforts" basis.152 Proponents of this
code believe that it would effectuate positive changes in China by asserting
U.S. businesses' interest in supporting American policies in favor of human
rights.153
Considering the legislative intent behind section 307 and the U.S.
interest in imports of prison labor products from the PRC, the current
proposal for a voluntary code of conduct is misguided. A code specifically
tailored to enforcing section 307 would be more effective, more palatable
for businesses to adopt, and more legitimate in the eyes of the PRC.
1. The Benefits of the Proposed Code
Several aspects of the proposed code would be useful in curbing
prison labor imports into the U.S. Unlike using sanctions like revoking
M.F.N., the code does not involve any sanctions or alienation of the PRC
from U.S. businesses. Instead, it would be voluntary, and the U.S. govern-
ment would not be compelling businesses to take any action they did not
wish to take.154 It would be left to the discretion of the company to deter-
mine if the local Chinese officials would be cooperative with the
companies' adherence to the code. The code also gives businesses a way in
which they can address issues important to American consumers, without
discouraging investment. 155 Several businesses, such as Sears, Roebuck
and Co. and Levi Strauss and Co. have already adopted their own codes. 156
2. Problems with the Proposed Code
Businesses also object to the voluntary code for several reasons.
First, businesses fear that adopting a voluntary code would undermine their
competitiveness in the PRC, labeling them as agents of the U.S. govern-
151 Id
152 Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 7, at 83.
153 Gargan, supra note 148.
154 Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 7, at 83.
155 Id
156 Id at 107; see also Gargan, supra note 148.
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ment.157 Businesses are also leery of creating the notion for the public that
they are morally responsible for the human rights situation in China.158
Business do not want the U.S. government dictating how they should handle
their investments in China.159
Besides the general objections to the voluntary code, the current pro-
posed code would not be useful in addressing section 307 concerns for
several reasons. The code as proposed is not tailored to the meaning of
section 307. It addresses prison labor only as a human rights issue and not
as a trade issue in which the U.S. and its businesses have a legitimate
economic interest. 160 Other problems include the voluntary nature of the
code. There is no guarantee that businesses will adopt it or adhere to it. In
addition, adopting the code might expose businesses to increased liability
under section 307. The trade act requires that businesses have knowledge
that they are importing products made by prison labor. If a business adopts
the code, then is found in violation of section 307, actions the business took
in order to implement its code (such as inspection of production facilities)
could be used against them.
B. Modification of the Voluntary Code Tailored to Section 307
Enforcement
Because the U.S. has a very limited ability to enforce section 307,
Congress should create another means by which companies can abide by the
law. As discussed earlier, enforcement from within U.S. borders is nearly
impossible.'61 Through enforcement of the MOU, the U.S. has secured
access to inspect some production facilities, but this has been a very slow
process with few positive results.162 A voluntary code of conduct, while
objectionable to some in a strict human rights context, is ideally suited to
address the problems inherent in enforcing section 307. Businesses' adher-
ence to a voluntary code of conduct would give the U.S. another direct path
to production facilities in order to ensure compliance with existing U.S. law.
157 Gargan, supra note 148.
158 Id.
159 Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 7, at 84-85.
160 For a discussion of the human rights applications of a voluntary code of conduct, see ido at 84.
161 See discussion infra part 111.B.I.
162 U.S.-China Trade Relations: Prepared Testimony of Christopher H. Smith Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, supra note 117.
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While the current proposals for a voluntary code of conduct would not
succeed in this area, a modified code would add much needed assistance.
A reformed code should not invoke the debate over business interests
versus human rights concerns. In the current proposed code, the language
indicates business should prohibit the use of prison labor because of human
rights concerns. The language should instead focus on adherence to section
307, a law which has governed businesses since 1931. Businesses have a
legitimate interest in asserting that they may engage in enterprises abroad
only if they do not subject the company to liability under domestic laws
with which they are required to comply. With this type of revision in the
code, businesses would run a smaller risk of alienating PRC officials. The
focus should be on concrete U.S. policies instead of "universal rights"
which some see as a form of "cultural imperialism". 163 As section 307 only
addresses the economic issues behind prison labor production and imports,
this should be the sole focus of the code. The code should concentrate the
economic issues related to prison labor production, such as wages and
hours, but any other human rights language should be eliminated.
Businesses have also objected to a human rights code of conduct
because the government would be dictating to them that they advance a
social policy, thus taking away their independence and undermining their
competitiveness. 164 In the human rights context, that argument may have
some merit. Yet in adhering to a reformed code focussing on section 307,
businesses would only be agreeing to abide by a law to which they are
already subjected. The companies would be protecting themselves from
liability at home instead of trying to change a situation abroad where U.S.
interest is somewhat debatable.
Even if a reformed code were adopted to enhance section 307
enforcement, the problem of potentially increased liability would remain.
The code would still be voluntary and adhered to on a "best efforts
basis." 165 Yet a company which agrees to a code may increase the grounds
163 Human rights are considered by many to be universal values, not American values. Orentlicher
& Gelatt, supra note 7, at 102. China argues, however, that although the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights was adopted internationally, "the issue of human rights falls by and large within the sovereignty of
each country.... The evolution of the situation in regard to human rights is circumscribed by the histori-
cal, social, economic and cultural conditions of various nations ...." White Paper on Human Rights in
China, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 1991, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, XINHUA
File.
164 Gargan, supra note 148.
165 See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 7, at 83.
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by which they "knowingly" use prison labor because they will arguably
have more access to that information. A mechanism is needed which would
protect businesses from increased liability if they adopted the code.
Human rights groups would object to a reformed code because it
would not be addressing human rights issues directly. Yet when
specifically targeting section 307 violations, prison labor should not be
viewed mainly as a human rights issue. This is not to say that other means
of addressing human rights violations in China should not be pursued. Yet
because the prison labor issue is grounded in U.S. trade law, it should be
treated as a trade issue, not a human rights issue. The concept of a code of
conduct is beneficial to section 307 enforcement and should be pursued.
On a practical level, adoption of a section 307 voluntary code of
conduct would work because it would help alleviate the chronic problem of
identifying products which come from prison labor factories. Companies
adhering to the code would be required to make a bona fide effort to deter-
mine if prison labor was used in their products. As a condition to forming a
contract, companies wanting to do business with China could require that
inspections be part of the deal. With direct economic incentive to give
inspections, the PRC might be more willing to do so. This would put U.S.
companies where the PRC has been extremely reluctant to let U.S. Customs
officials go.
Adopting a voluntary code of conduct is not the ultimate solution to
the prison labor import problem. The code would still be voluntary,
meaning there would be no guarantee it would be implemented. Thus, the
effectiveness of the code could be severely limited. In addition, there is no
real economic incentive for businesses to adhere to the code. Adherence
might limit the amount of cheap labor available, thus discouraging
investment. While this consideration has not stopped other companies from
adopting their own codes, 166 it must be considered.
C. The Solution: A Combination of Efforts
The best solution to the problem of enforcing section 307 would be a
combination of new and existing efforts. Because section 307 needs to be
enforced on many levels in order to be effective, the best solution should
address the problem on all those different levels.
166 See id at 107; see also Gargan, supra note 148.
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First, section 307 and its implementing regulations should be
retained. To improve U.S. enforcement of these regulations, more
inspections are needed. Because it is now well-recognized by the U.S. that
many imports from China are in flagrant violation of section 307, there
should be a targeted crackdown on products coming in. Improvement in
existing enforcement policies is an important first-step to over-all effective
enforcement.
Second, the MOU should be retained, and other diplomatic efforts to
end the problem should be pursued. Keeping the diplomatic channels open
will keep dialogue between the two countries going, and will be an
important tool in preventing any retaliatory actions. The U.S. should also
explore more fully ways in which it can successfully use applicable
international principles to gather international diplomatic support.
In addition, policies like using MEN to pursue undefined U.S. goals
should be abandoned. To be able to stand firmly behind its policies, the
U.S. must use laws that are specifically targeted at certain policy goals. The
U.S. must clearly define what its policy is regarding prison labor. The
political dilemma stemming from the debate over MFN and human rights is
a lesson that leaders should not have to learn twice.
Third, a voluntary code of conduct should be enacted to help enforce
section 307. The legislation should specifically target section 307 concerns,
While the code should not dictate behavior to businesses, it should provide
some incentive to encourage compliance. The code should also contain a
provision that assures a company's liability under section 307 would not be
increased. The code would be the best, most effective way to increase and
improve enforcement of section 307.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States has had little success effectively enforcing section
307 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. The organization of the
prison labor system in China makes it difficult for Customs to determine if
products are manufactured by prison labor. In addition, Customs does not
have the resources to fully implement section 307. As a result, products
produced by prison labor in China enter the U.S. every day, in violation of
U.S. law. The best solution to this problem would address the problem on
many levels. First, the U.S. should allocate more resources to Customs so
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that the department may enforce section 307 more actively. Second, it
should continue to pursue diplomatic means of solving the problem. And
third, the solution should include a voluntary code of conduct by which U.S.
businesses would limit their use of prison labor in business ventures in
China. The problem is a very complex one, and this proposed solution is
not the complete answer. It may, however, be more effective than the
policies that are currently being pursued.

